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While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent 
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 8 
percent between 2018 and 2025. This is a very ambitious 
target from the perspective of some provinces, especially 
Balochistan, where physical and social infrastructure devel-
opment lags behind the rest of the country. The “Proposed 
Balochistan Development and Vision Strategy” of the Chief 
Minister’s Policy Reform Unit aims to focus in coming years 
on developing basic infrastructure and primary sectors, con-
centrating investments on identified “growth nodes”—select-
ed sectors and areas that can be expected to create a pull 
effect on the wider economy. Population growth is generally 
not regarded as a concern in provincial economic strategy 
since Balochistan has the sparsest population in the coun-
try. However, this perspective ignores the powerful impact of 
demographic trends on future economic growth. Moreover, it 
overlooks the urgent need for birth spacing services in the 
province to reduce the extremely high maternal mortality ra-
tio, as well as infant and child deaths accruing from high-risk 
fertility behavior.
Balochistan is currently undergoing a demographic transition 
from a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of 
lower fertility and mortality (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in 
its working-age population means the province is poised to 
reap a “demographic dividend”—the boost in income per cap-
ita and its growth that accrues when the share of working age 
individuals in a population rises relative to dependents, result-
ing in a higher support ratio,1 as well as increased labor sup-
ply and savings. As the Asian Tigers have demonstrated, a ro-
bust working-age population can serve as a potent, real world 
pathway for achieving economic growth. However, harnessing 
the powerful thrust of the demographic dividend requires the 
timely execution of a well-conceived plan of action involving 
major interventions in the education, health (including repro-
ductive health/population welfare), and labor sectors.
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Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked, 
if not driven, by how rapidly fertility declines further.
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FIGURE 1:  EMERGING BULGE IN BALOCHISTAN’S WORKING-AGE POPULATION
Source: Population Census 1972 Source: Population Council Projections 2015
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Encouragingly, Vision 2025 shows a strong focus on 
enhancing the productive potential of the current 
and future work force through investments in edu-
cation, skills development, and job creation. Simi-
larly, the need for institutional and human resource 
development has recently been emphasized by the 
highest levels of the Government of Balochistan. 
However, there is relatively low awareness that fer-
tility decline—and in particular the speed of that 
decline—will have a huge impact on the magnitude 
of the economic boost it is able to reap from the 
demographic dividend. 
A recent study of prospects for economic growth in 
Pakistan under alternative demographic scenarios 
quantified the massive differences in growth that 
can be achieved with slow, moderate and rapid 
fertility decline in Balochistan.2 This brief presents 
the study’s key findings to facilitate a deeper under-
standing of the connection between the speed of 
fertility decline and the size of the demographic div-
idend, and the scale of the economic gains at stake.
FERTILITY DECLINE AND 
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIVIDEND IN BALOCHISTAN
As fertility declines in Balochistan, the rate of growth in the 
lowest tiers of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing 
down. However, due to the momentum of past high fertility 
and current improvements in infant and child survival, there 
will not be an appreciable change in the rate of growth of the 
working-age population for perhaps two decades. In propor-
tion to dependents, the working-age share of the total popu-
lation is rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future 
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed 
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed 
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and 
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pa-
kistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1 (back page). 
Projections of the total population were generated for three 
fertility decline scenarios—moderate decline in the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) from the current level of 4.2 to replacement 
fertility (TFR 2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would 
mean that replacement fertility is reached sometime after 
2050; and rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement 
fertility is attained before 2050. For population projections, 
the base year was 1998, when the last census was conduct-
ed, while 2011 was taken as the base year for the per capita 
income and demographic dividend comparison. The results 
of the study for Balochistan are summarized in Table 1. 
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility de-
cline, the population of Balochistan could grow to 18 million 
or to 16 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid 
fertility decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately 
1.5 million more young dependents in the population. This 
will translate into a lower support ratio—1.62, as against 1.96 
with rapid fertility decline (Table 1).
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the productive 
capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which creates 
the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demographic 
dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic dividend, 
the support ratio must be maintained at optimal levels while 
the “boom” in the working-age population lasts. Fertility must 
decline as much as possible to raise the support ratio, and as 
fast as possible to allow the high support ratio to prevail over 
a longer period. Figure 3 presents the historical and prospec-
tive trend in Balochistan’s support ratio and how it is affect-
ed by the pace of fertility decline. Notably, the support ratio 
started to rise in the late 1990s—when energetic efforts were 
made to increase uptake of family planning—but it is now be-
ginning to plateau. It can be expected to rise significantly if a 
moderate or rapid pace of fertility decline is achieved.
“The need for lowering the growth rate of 
population is more urgent than ever.” 
VISION 2025
Scenario 1
Slow Fertility 
Decline
Scenario 2
Moderate 
Fertility Decline
Scenario 3
Rapid Fertility 
Decline
Assume TFR
Remains 0.5 
births higher 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Declines steadi-
ly to 2.1 births 
per woman by 
2050
Remains 0.5 
births lower 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Total 
Population
17.9 million 16.9 million 15.9 million
Support ratio 1.62 1.78 1.96
Per capita GDP 
Growth
295% 338% 338%
Demographic 
Dividend
130% 173% 223%
TABLE 1:  PROJECTED DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROW TH 
IN BALOCHISTAN IN 2050 WITH SLOW, MODERATE, 
AND RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
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Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide diver-
gences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4). 
In 2050, per capita income in Balochistan is expected to be 
about $2,500 if fertility persists at current levels; a little over 
$3,600, if fertility declines slowly; and about $4,500, if fertil-
ity drops rapidly.
This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the 
current vicinity of 4.2, Balochistan’s GDP per capita will only 
be about 165 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; how-
ever, if the TFR declines rapidly, Balochistan’s GDP per capita 
could grow by as much as 388 percent. In other words, a pre-
cipitous decline in fertility could boost income in Balochistan 
by 223 percent over current levels, independent of any addi-
tional income growth that occurs over this horizon. By com-
parison, a slow decline in fertility would lead to a 130 percent 
boost in income, which, significant as it is, represents only 
about half of the dividend achievable.
The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease 
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to in-
crease by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to 
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of 
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort 
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support 
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for in-
vesting in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
By 2050, Balochistan’s per capita income will be 165 per-
cent higher than today’s levels if there is no decline in fer-
tility, but 388 percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The 
scale and effectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in 
Balochistan will determine whether per capita income in the 
province grows by 295 percent or by 388 percent by 2050. 
The possible demographic dividend of a 223 percent in-
crease in per capita income is simply too huge to be ignored 
in economic growth strategy, especially given Balochistan’s 
resource constraints and development aspirations. The find-
ings presented in this brief show clearly that, if Balochistan is 
to harness the demographic dividend, planners must invest 
at least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise the contra-
ceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to educate, 
train and productively employ the youth bulge.
FIGURE 2:  PROJECTED POPULATION GROW TH IN 
BALOCHISTAN WITH SLOW, MODERATE, 
AND RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 3:  HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PROJECTED 
GROW TH IN BALOCHISTAN’S SUPPORT 
RATIO WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 4:  PROJECTED PER CAPITAL GDP GROW TH 
IN BALOCHISTAN WITH SLOW, MODERATE, 
AND RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan 
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025
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Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limit-
ed-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels, 
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance 
of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By around 
2050, the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will 
have progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while a 
reduced population of young people will have entered Baloch-
istan’s work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline 
and the dividend window will close. 
GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth 
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.
Where yt = log(   ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(   ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demo-
graphic variables. 
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1. Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement 
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.
2. Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per 
woman) assumption throughout.
3. Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births 
per woman) assumption throughout. 
An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
IDDi  =                     .     
Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y
0
2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the 
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015). 
BOX 1:  MODEL USED TO PROJECT PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC GROW TH UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS
yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + η
T Xt + €tα
Yt
Pt
Yt
Lt
yi2050 – y
0
2050
y2011
ENDNOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative 
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population 
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E. 
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under 
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR 
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman 
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three 
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.
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“The speed at which fertility declines now in 
Balochistan will determine the magnitude of 
the economic boost it will experience.”
